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Abstract: 
 
Despite the recent increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) to 
African countries, these resources have not had a meaningful impact 
on economic development because of limited effects on domestic factor 
markets, especially domestic investment and employment. In this 
context, this study analyses the two-way linkages between FDI and 
domestic investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. The results suggest that 
firstly, FDI crowds in domestic investment, and secondly, countries 
will gain much from measures aimed at improving the domestic 
investment climate. Moreover, there are alternatives to resource 
endowments as a means of attracting foreign investment to non-
resource rich countries.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The current debate on African economic development has devoted much attention to 
the role of external resource inflows, including foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
their potential contribution to accelerating growth and progress towards reaching 
development goals in Africa (UNECA, 2006). Recent evidence indicates that FDI to 
African countries has been on the rise, especially since the 1990s (Ndikumana, 2003; 
UNECA, 2006), consistent with the general trend of private capital flows in 
developing regions.  
 
However, two main issues arise with regard to recent trends of FDI to Africa. First, 
although the volume of FDI to Africa has increased substantially since the 1990s, 
Africa remains largely marginalized in the context of financial globalisation. Though 
Africa’s share in world FDI flows reached 3.1per cent in 2005, it is still less than half 
of the share reached in the 1970s. Therefore, to the extent that attracting more FDI 
remains a desirable objective, the first challenge is to make African countries more 
attractive to foreign investors. Second, despite the increase in private capital inflows, 
these resources have not had a meaningful impact on economic development in 
African countries. Thus the second challenge is how to increase the developmental 
impact of FDI in African economies. 
 
This paper seeks to provide empirical evidence that sheds light on these two critical 
challenges faced by economies, focusing in particular on the sub-Saharan region. With 
regard to the first challenge, the study starts from the view that to design effective 
strategies for making Africa more competitive, it is essential to understand the drivers 
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of FDI. This study contributes to the debate by providing further evidence on the 
determinants of FDI to African countries. A growing body of literature has uncovered 
a large range of determinants of FDI in developing countries in general, although 
relatively less is known for the specific case of African countries (see Asiedu, 2002, 
2005).  
 
A distinguishing feature of this study is the emphasis on the role of both domestic 
private and public investment in attracting private foreign capital. Though the 
literature also suggests that an investment-friendly labour market regulation should 
improve a country’s position in the eyes of foreign investors, it is difficult to analyse 
this important dimension of domestic factor markets due to inadequate data. For this 
reason we focus on domestic investment as a determinant of FDI inflows. In this 
respect, a strong private investment record is likely to act as a signal of high returns to 
capital while adequate public infrastructure (through high public investment) reduces 
the cost of doing business, which raises the marginal return to FDI. This study seeks to 
provide evidence on these linkages with a view to shed light on strategies that may 
help African economies to increase private capital inflows. 
 
With regard to the second challenge, the study posits that a major reason for the 
limited effects of FDI on development in the host economies is the lack of synergies 
between FDI and domestic public and private investment. While FDI can stimulate 
growth,1 these growth effects are sustainable only if FDI stimulates the utilization of 
domestic factors of production, especially by increasing employment and stimulating 
private investment. This will complement other important effects of FDI on the 
                                                 
1 Some references for the evidence on the impact of FDI on growth include Ankilo (2003), Baliamoune-
Lutz (2004); and Mold (2004).  
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domestic economy, including technological spillover effects and facilitating access to 
global markets. Thus, by empirically investigating the effects of FDI on domestic 
factor markets, this study contributes to uncovering the channels through which FDI 
can affect economic growth. 
 
To empirically investigate the two questions, that is, the impact of domestic factor 
markets on FDI on the one hand and the effects of FDI on domestic factor markets on 
the other hand, we use a sample of 38 Sub-Saharan African countries for the period 
1970-2005 (see Appendix I). We use two estimation methodologies to explore the 
robustness of the results: a robust OLS estimator controlling for outliers, which is an 
important issue given the high diversity across African countries; and a fixed-effects 
specification to take into account country-specific effects. We also explore the impact 
of resource-intensity by both including measures of resource endowment (share of 
resources in exports) in the equation and by estimating the equations by sub-samples 
classified by resource intensity following Collier and O’Connell (2006). 
 
The results shed light on the two key questions investigated by this study. First, the 
evidence suggests a strong relationship between foreign direct investment and 
domestic investment. The relationship runs both ways, but the impact of private 
domestic investment on FDI is stronger and more robust than the reverse relation. This 
suggests that high domestic private investment is a signal for high returns to capital, 
which attracts foreign investment. Thus, efforts to improve incentives for private 
investment will pay off by, among other things, making African countries more 
competitive in the eyes of foreign investors. Public investment does not appear to be a 
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major driver of FDI in these African countries, which may reflect the inefficiency of 
public infrastructure. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides stylised facts 
on the trends of FDI relative to domestic investment in African countries. It also 
examines correlations between FDI and characteristics of domestic factor markets in 
addition to factors that have been identified in the literature as important determinants 
of FDI. Section 3 undertakes a detailed econometric investigation of the impact of 
domestic investment on FDI, taking into account other established correlates of FDI. 
Section 4 examines the effects of FDI on private investment. Section 5 summarizes the 
findings and concludes by highlighting key policy implications. 
 
2. FDI in sub-Saharan African countries: stylised facts 
 
2.1 Trends in FDI and domestic investment in SSA  
In general, FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is low in comparison to other developing 
regions, concentrated in a few countries and largely targeting the natural resources 
sector. In recent years FDI flows to the region have been growing strongly in response 
to not only high commodity prices but also to improved macroeconomic stability. FDI 
inflows to SSA surpassed US$20 billion in 2005, a 58.1 per cent increase on the 
previous year. As a result of this development, the region’s share in global flows has 
increased from 0.5 per cent in 2000 to 2.2 per cent in 2005, though this remains far 
below the peak of 1970 (6.2%) (Figure 1). The continuing low share for the region 
reflects the dominance of China and other emerging economies in attracting foreign 
investment since the 1980s. 
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Figure 1: FDI to SSA: volume and share in world inflows, 1970 – 2005 
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Source: UNCTAD, FDI online database. 
 
Figure 2 displays the evolution of FDI inflows to the sample of 38 SSA countries used 
in this paper, in comparison to gross private and public investment as ratios of gross 
domestic product. As evident in this graph, FDI inflows have been increasing since the 
mid-1990s, peaking at 4.8 per cent of GDP in 2003. Gross private investment reached 
a maximum of 16.4 per cent of GDP in 1972 before declining to around 10 per cent in 
the early 1980s. Since the 1990s, private investment rates have been slowly increasing.  
In comparison, gross public investment peaked at around 14 per cent in 1976 before 
declining rapidly over the following decade and has stagnated at between 7 per cent 
and 8 per cent since 1984. 
 
The clear message from these trends is that while FDI is increasing in sub-Saharan 
African countries, domestic investment, particularly public investment, remains low 
and is not responding enough to the improvements in economic and political 
conditions observed on the continent over the past two decades (see also UNECA 
(2006)). 
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Figure 2: Trends in FDI, private and public investment for 38 sub-Saharan African 
countries, 1970-2005 
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Notes: FDI/GDP = foreign direct investment/GDP; PRIV/GDP = gross private 
investment/GDP; PUB/GDP = gross public investment/GDP.  
Source: UNCTAD, FDI online database; World Bank Africa Database 2006; World 
Development Indicators, online database. 
 
Looking at the cross-country differences in these three dimensions of investment 
reveals significant variations across sub-Saharan countries (Table A1 in Appendix II). 
The countries with the highest average FDI/GDP ratios are Angola (6.9%), Chad 
(6.2%) and Seychelles (5.2%). The high ratios for Chad and Angola represent recent 
investments in the natural resource sector. Burundi, Burkina Faso and surprisingly 
Kenya have the lowest average FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP, all with figures 
below 1 per cent. Overall, 15 out of the 38 countries in the sample have average ratios 
of less than 1 per cent of GDP. 
 
In contrast, the largest private investment/GDP ratios are found in Lesotho (33.9% of 
GDP), Gabon (23.2%) and Botswana (21.2%). Resource-rich countries like Angola 
have not yet translated their large export revenues into an increase in domestic private 
investment.  Most of the countries with above average ratios of private investment are 
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middle-income countries. Least-developed countries (LDCs) tend to have lower 
private investment rates, with Burundi, Niger and Central African Republic having the 
lowest ratios (less than 5% of GDP). 
 
Finally, public investment, which is driven by very different factors than foreign and 
domestic private investment, also varies considerably across the sub-Saharan countries 
in the sample. The average ratio of gross public investment to GDP ranges from 2.5 
per cent in Zimbabwe to 20.5 per cent in Guinea-Bissau.  
 
The recent commodity price boom has fuelled a considerable inflow of FDI to the 
natural resource sector in a number of African countries. This is reflected in the 
average FDI inflows in addition to differences in private and public investment across 
the sample. The groupings used in this descriptive analysis and below in estimating the 
empirical models are based on Collier and O’Connell (2006) (see Appendix I for an 
explanation of these groupings). FDI as a ratio of GDP is accordingly higher in 
resource-intensive countries (Table 1). Interestingly, private investment is also higher, 
reflecting perhaps the impact of FDI on private investment in these countries. In 
contrast, public investment is marginally higher in non-resource-intensive countries. 
 
Table 1: FDI, private and public investment by resource-intensity 
 
Grouping FDI/GDP 
Private 
investment/GDP
Public 
investment/GDP
Full sample 1.77 12.09 8.00 
Non-resource-intensive 1.39 11.31 8.11 
Resource-intensive 2.74 13.89 7.71 
 
Source: UNCTAD, FDI online database; World Bank Africa Database 2006. 
Notes: See Appendix I for an explanation of these groupings. 
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Looking at these variables in these groupings reveals a couple trends (Figures 3 and 4). 
Firstly, as illustrated in Figure 3, FDI inflows have been in general higher and more 
volatile in resource-intensive countries, with a considerable divergence in recent years 
as a consequence of the commodity boom. This was also witnessed in the late 1970s. 
Note also that FDI inflows have been more volatile among resource-intensive 
countries. This may reflect the lumpiness of FDI in resource exploration and 
extraction, which results from the large fixed costs involved in such projects.  
 
Figure 3: Trends in FDI by resource-intensity, 1970-2005 
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Source: UNCTAD, FDI online database; World Development Indicators, online database. 
 
Turning to private investment (Figure 4) shows that higher rates of private investment 
in resource-intensive countries was only evident between 1970 and 1986, after which 
there has been considerable convergence of private investment across the two groups 
of countries. In comparison, the trends in public investment are not as different, with a 
slightly higher degree of volatility witnessed in non-resource-intensive countries. 
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Figure 4: Trends in private and public investment by resource-intensity, 1970-2004 
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Notes: private-resource = private investment/GDP in resource-intensive countries; private-
nonresource = private investment /GDP in non-resource-intensive countries; public-resource = 
public investment/GDP in resource-intensive countries; public-nonresource = public 
investment /GDP in non-resource-intensive countries. 
Source: UNCTAD, FDI online database; World Bank Africa Database 2006; World 
Development Indicators, online database. 
 
 
2.2 The relationship between investment and key determinants 
In Section 3 we undertake a detailed econometric analysis of the determinants of FDI, 
with a particular focus on the role of domestic factor markets. In this section, we start 
by investigating correlations between FDI and characteristics of domestic factor 
markets as well as other determinants including macroeconomic, political, and human 
capital variables.  
 
As can be seen in Table 2, FDI inflows are significantly and positively correlated with 
a range of determinants typically employed in the literature: GDP growth, openness as 
measured by total trade, infrastructure as measured by the number of telephone 
subscribers, natural resource endowment and the quality of polity (see, for e.g., Asiedu 
2002, 2004, 2005; Dupasquier and Osakwe, 2006; Kandiero and Chitiga, 2006; Lydon 
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and Williams, 2005; UNECA, 2006). A positive correlation is evident between 
FDI/GDP and the stock of FDI inflows, suggesting that foreign companies continue to 
invest in countries where they have a presence in addition to the attraction of other 
foreign entities to an established market that already caters for foreign investors.  
 
Table 2: Correlations between FDI/GDP and key determinants 
 
Variable 
Pearson's correlation 
coefficient P-value 
No. Of 
observations 
GDP growth 0.11 0.00 1228 
Openness 0.35 0.00 1203 
Log of telephone subscribers 0.24 0.00 1059 
Log of FDI stock 0.30 0.00 939 
Detrended REER 0.02 0.58 644 
REER volatility -0.16 0.00 644 
Detrended CPI -0.08 0.03 866 
CPI volatility 0.21 0.00 866 
Polity score 0.07 0.02 1120 
Oil, mineral and ore exports as % 
of total merchandise exports 0.13 0.00 595 
Ogive concentration index 0.19 0.00 755 
 
Source: Polity IV Project; UNCTAD, FDI online database; World Development 
Indicators, online database. 
 
In terms of political variables, FDI inflows are positively correlated with a composite 
indicator of democracy and autocracy (polity2).2 This suggests that FDI inflows are 
higher in countries that are more democratic. However, looking at this combined polity 
score as a categorical variable rather than as a single indicator reveals that this 
correlation is not linear. As illustrated in Table 3, countries that are classified as 
weakly autocratic have the highest average FDI/GDP ratio. Based on the average score 
for the period 2000-2004, countries in this category include Angola, Chad, Republic of 
Congo and Gabon, where high FDI inflows are largely driven by natural resource 
extraction.  
 
                                                 
2 See Marshall and Jaggers (2005) for detailed information on this polity indicator. 
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In comparison, private investment is higher in strongly democratic countries, which 
underscores the importance of a supportive investment climate, including good 
governance and institutions, in promoting domestic private investment. On the other 
hand, public investment is higher in both strongly autocratic and strongly democratic 
countries, suggesting no clear relationship between public investment and the polity. 
 
Table 3: Investment (% of GDP) by political regimes  
 
Type of political regime FDI/GDP PRIV/GDP PUB/GDP 
Strongly autocratic 1.13 11.55 8.93 
Weakly autocratic 2.76 12.08 6.21 
Weakly democratic 1.41 10.38 7.21 
Strongly democratic 1.94 13.85 8.44 
 
Source: Polity IV; UNCTAD, FDI online database; World Bank Africa Database 
2006; World Development Indicators, online database. 
 
FDI inflows are unsurprisingly also positively correlated with the proportion of natural 
resources in merchandise exports. Countries where oil, minerals and ore account for 
more than 50 per cent of merchandise exports have on average a FDI/GDP ratio of 2.1 
per cent compared to 1.4 per cent for countries with lower shares of resources in 
exports. In these natural resource rich countries, private and public investment/ GDP 
ratios are also higher. This relationship is also captured by the positive correlation 
between FDI and the Ogive index of concentration of exports, implying that inflows 
are higher in countries with lower levels of export diversification. In fact, this result 
suggests that FDI may contribute to further concentration of production and exports, 
exposing the recipients further to export instability. 
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2.3 Relationship between FDI and domestic factor markets 
Turning to the main focus of this paper, we investigate the correlation between FDI 
and domestic factor markets. As evident in Table 4, FDI is positively correlated with a 
range of variables characterising the domestic factor markets.  
 
Firstly, foreign investment is higher when both private and public investment ratios are 
higher, though the correlation is much higher in the case of private investment. This is 
a first indication of the important relationship between these three investment 
variables. In addition to the insight provided by these correlations, it is important to 
recognise that there variables are related over time in a dynamic relationship with 
causality running in both directions. These issues are investigated further in sections 3 
and 4 below. 
 
Table 4: Correlations between FDI and domestic factor market characteristics 
 
Variable 
Pearson's correlation 
coefficient P-value 
No. of 
observations 
Private investment/GDP 0.25 0.00 895 
Public investment/GDP 0.06 0.07 877 
Monthly manufacturing wage 0.37 0.00 194 
Monthly manufacturing wage differential 0.35 0.00 194 
Rigidity of employment index 0.10 0.34 90 
Youth literacy rate 0.06 0.14 680 
 
Source: UNCTAD, FDI online database; UNESCO Institute for Statistics, online database; 
World Bank Africa Database 2006; World Development Indicators, online database. 
 
Secondly, there is also evidence of a large positive correlation between FDI inflows 
and monthly manufacturing wages, contrary to a negative relationship between labour 
costs and FDI implied by theory and as found in certain empirical studies.3 Moreover, 
                                                 
3 Asiedu (2002) reports that different cross-country studies find that labour costs can have either a 
positive, negative or insignificant effect on FDI. However, Kucera (2002:4) argues that the evidence 
“leans towards suggesting that higher labour costs negatively affect FDI”. The negative effects appear to 
be stronger in studies that have controlled for differences in labour productivity (Kucera, 2004). 
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there is also a positive correlation between FDI and the wage differential, which is 
defined here as the difference between the country-level monthly manufacturing wage 
and the average in the sample for that year. This implies that countries that have above 
average wages tend to also have higher FDI/GDP ratios. As shown in some of the 
literature, this could be the result of foreign-owned firms paying a wage premium (see, 
for example, te Velde and Morrissey (2003) for evidence based on data from five 
African countries). Alternatively, foreign investors could be attracted to countries with 
higher levels of human capital, which is reflected in higher wages. Another possibility 
is that foreign investors are able to absorb high wage rates due to high returns to 
capital. The positive correlation between the wage rate and FDI is also consistent with 
the fact that FDI to Africa flows mostly into natural resource industries, which are 
capital intensive. 
 
In addition to the direct cost of wages, the literature has investigated whether labour 
market regulations and the resulting rigidity in terms of hiring, firing, hours and other 
key factors deter foreign investors. For example, if legislation prevents or severely 
constrains the dismissal of workers, firms will have lower incentives in the first place 
to hire new employees. Such regulations could, at least theoretically, deter foreign 
companies from investing in a specific country (see OECD (2004) and UNECA (2006) 
for a further discussion on these issues).  
 
However, empirical evidence on this relationship is mixed. Javorcik and Spatareanu 
(2005) find that greater labour market flexibility in the host country in absolute and 
relative terms is correlated with higher FDI flows. In contrast, Kucera (2002) finds no 
support for the hypothesis that foreign investors favour countries with lower labour 
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standards, which suggests that the benefits of sound labour standards outweigh the 
costs. Although Africa has relatively rigid employment regulations in comparison to 
other developing regions, the correlation presented in Table 3 does not suggest any 
significant relationship between the rigidity of employment and FDI inflows. 
 
Human capital is another important determinant of FDI inflows, as investigated by 
such studies as Noorbakhsh, Paloni and Youssef (2001), who find that this factor is 
one of the most important drivers of foreign investment. Contrasting this stylised fact, 
there is no statistical evidence of a positive correlation between FDI/GDP and the 
youth literacy rate in the case of the sample of African countries considered in this 
study (Table 4).  
 
Table 5: Investment (% of GDP) by level of youth literacy 
 
Level of youth literacy FDI 
Private  
investment 
Public 
investment
FDI stock 
(US$ millions) 
1970-2005     
Low youth literacy rate (<25th percentile) 1.64 8.28 8.44 192.94 
Medium youth literacy rate 
(25th percentile - 75th percentile) 1.53 10.37 7.68 1130.14 
High youth literacy rate (>75th percentile)  1.99 14.16 6.53 4128.12 
After 1997     
Low youth literacy rate (<25th percentile) 7.68 12.74 9.08 541.61 
Medium youth literacy rate  
(25th percentile - 75th percentile) 2.62 10.47 6.99 1651.93 
High youth literacy rate (>75th percentile)  3.25 13.37 6.09 7047.04 
 
Source: UNCTAD, FDI online database; UNESCO Institute for Statistics online database; 
World Bank Africa Database 2006; World Development Indicators, online database 
 
If we look at investment ratios by various percentiles in the distribution of youth 
literacy rate in the sample, a different relationship emerges. Firstly, as displayed in 
Table 5, FDI inflows, the stock of FDI, and private investment are higher in countries 
with higher youth literacy rates (this includes countries like Botswana, Namibia and 
South Africa), while public investment is the lowest in such countries.  
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Restricting the sample to post-1997, a period where FDI inflows have accelerated, 
provides evidence of another relationship. In this case, FDI is considerably higher in 
countries with low literacy rates (<46%). This category includes countries such as 
Chad where oil exploration and exploitation have attracted large FDI inflows. This 
does not imply that human capital is not an important driver of FDI in African 
countries. Rather, as clearly evidenced by the positive and increasing relationship 
between literacy rate category and stock of FDI, human capital is important for 
sustaining foreign investment over the longer term. 
 
3. Econometric analysis of the linkages between domestic investment and FDI 
 
The summary statistics presented above provide an insight into the relationship 
between foreign investment and a range of structural or fundamental factors, in 
addition to the correlations with domestic factor markets. In this section, we 
investigate the impact of the variables discussed above on FDI inflows and private 
investment, controlling for outliers, unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity of 
variables, which can bias estimates. The analysis is based on the following 
specification: 
itiit
it
X
GDP
FDI εµβα ++′+=  ,   (1) 
where FDI/GDP is the net inflow of foreign direct investment as a ratio to real GDP, X 
is a vector of determinants including domestic investment, µi the time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity term and εit the random error term. 
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3.1 Fundamental determinants of FDI 
As highlighted in Sections 1 and 2, the literature on FDI has identified a range of key 
determinants including economic growth, openness, and infrastructure. Our base 
empirical specification includes these variables in addition to the lagged stock of FDI 
to capture the impact of existing foreign investment on new FDI inflows. We also 
include a dummy for post-1997 to reflect the shift in the trend in FDI inflows. 
Dummies for Angola and Chad interacted with a dummy for the period after 1997 are 
also used in the empirical specifications to test the sensitivity of our results to the 
substantial rise in FDI/GDP ratios in these countries starting in the second half of the 
1990s. Though the fixed-effects estimator removes the time-invariant country effect, it 
does not account for such a time-varying impact at the country-level. The estimates for 
equation (1) using the fixed-effects method and the robust OLS estimator where 
outliers have been weighted are reported in Table 6. Column 4 reports the results with 
the Angola and Chad dummies and a post-1997 dummy. 
  
The coefficient estimates reported in Table 6 are largely consistent with the results 
found in the literature. The robust OLS results in column (1) show that GDP growth, 
openness, and the stock of FDI all have a large positive effect on FDI inflows. The 
structural break dummy capturing the shift in the trend after 1997 has the expected 
positive effect on FDI inflows. Contrary to expectations, the coefficient on the 
infrastructure variable (log of telephone subscribers) is negative. This may reflect the 
fact that the resource-rich countries that have attracted FDI also have an 
underdeveloped telecommunication network. It is also possible that FDI inflows to 
Sub-Saharan Africa are being attracted by opportunities in the undeveloped 
telecommunications sector in many countries, suggesting reverse causality. However, 
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in the case of the fixed effects regression (columns 2 and 3) the coefficient on this 
variable becomes positive and significant, suggesting that the correlation with the 
unobserved country time-invariant heterogeneity (µi) was causing a bias in the OLS 
estimates. 
 
Table 6: Structural determinants of FDI: contemporaneous effects 
 
Dependent variable: FDI/GDP    
 OLS FE FE 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) 
GDP growth 0.019** 
(0.009) 
0.040** 
(0.017) 
0.018 
(0.016) 
Openness  0.020*** 
(0.002) 
0.038*** 
(0.007) 
0.025*** 
(0.006) 
Log of telephone subscribers  -0.100** 
(0.047) 
0.319* 
(0.170) 
0.434** 
(0.156) 
Log of stock of FDI inflows (t-1) 0.213*** 
(0.035) 
0.617*** 
(0.158) 
0.545*** 
(0.144) 
Post-1997 0.945*** 
(0.131) 
0.832** 
(0.348) 
0.272 
(0.320) 
Chad*Post-1997   10.453*** 
(1.189) 
Angola*Post-1997   12.386*** 
(1.206) 
R² 0.30 0.21 0.37 
F-Statistic 74.59*** 47.15*** 65.76*** 
No. of observations 868 867 868 
 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses; *** - significant at the 1 per cent level, ** - 
significant at the 5 per cent level, and * - significant at the 10 per cent level;  
OLS = robust OLS regression where outliers are weighted; FE = fixed effects regression. The 
R-squared reported for the fixed-effects model is the overall statistic. 
 
As an alternative way of controlling for potential simultaneity bias, we estimate 
equation (1) using lagged explanatory variables. The results for this specification are 
listed in Table 7, which are in line with those reported above in Table 6.  
 
As reported in column 3, the estimates from the specification with the dummies for 
Angola and Chad are similar to column 2, expect for the number of telephone 
subscribers which becomes positive and significant as expected. 
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The results in Tables 6 and 7 suggest that the positive effects of structural factors such 
as GDP, openness and telecommunications infrastructure are robust to any possible 
simultaneity of the relationship between these factors and FDI.  
 
Table 7: Fundamental determinants of FDI, lagged effects 
 
Dependent variable: FDI/GDP    
 OLS FE FE 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) 
GDP growth (t-1) 0.020** 
(0.009) 
0.061*** 
(0.019) 
0.041** 
(0.017) 
Openness (t-1) 0.022*** 
(0.002) 
0.033*** 
(0.007) 
0.016** 
(0.007) 
Log of telephone subscribers (t-1) -0.158*** 
(0.048) 
0.300 
(0.199) 
0.373** 
(0.178) 
Log of stock of FDI inflows (t-1) 0.246*** 
(0.036) 
0.711*** 
(0.178) 
0.649*** 
(0.159) 
Post-1997 0.971*** 
(0.128) 
0.980*** 
(0.373) 
0.401 
(0.336) 
Chad*Post-1997   10.236*** 
(1.350) 
Angola*Post-1997   16.381*** 
(1.276) 
R² 0.31 0.18 0.39 
F-Statistic 76.90*** 39.50*** 66.04*** 
No. of observations 869 869 869 
 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses; *** - significant at the 1 per cent level, ** - 
significant at the 5 per cent level, and * - significant at the 10 per cent level; OLS = robust OLS 
regression where outliers are weighted; FE = fixed effects regression. The R-squared reported 
for the fixed-effects model is the overall statistic. 
 
3.2 Macroeconomic variables, political instability and natural resources as 
determinants of FDI 
In addition to the above determinants of FDI inflows, additional variables such 
macroeconomic fundamentals, political stability, and natural resources have proven to 
be important drivers of foreign investment (see Asiedu (2005)).  
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The results presented in Table 8 show that, consistent with theory and existing 
evidence, inflation4 and instability in prices are deterrents for FDI inflows to Sub-
Saharan Africa. However, the results do not confirm the expected negative effect of 
exchange rate instability on FDI. This again may illustrate the particular situation in 
Africa where FDI is predominantly resource-seeking and highly profitable and thus 
offsetting the costs due to exchange rate instability. However, this result no longer 
holds for the specification with the Angola and Chad dummies (not reported here for 
reason of space). 
 
In terms of political regime, the fixed-effects estimates in Table 8 (column 6) indicate 
that countries that have either strongly or weakly democratic governments attract 
lower FDI inflows than countries that are strongly autocratic. This latter group 
includes resource-rich countries such as Nigeria. Rather than suggesting that 
promoting democracy doesn’t help attract foreign investors, this result reflects that 
natural resource rich countries tend to be more autocratic. In this respect, both the OLS 
and fixed-effects results (columns 7 and 8) unsurprisingly indicate that countries with 
a higher share of oil, mineral and ore in total merchandise exports tend to have higher 
FDI/GDP ratios. The results using the Ogive concentration index are very similar 
(these estimates are not reported in Table 8 for reason of space). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Using the Angola and Chad dummies (interacted with the post 1997 dummy) results in a positive 
coefficient on the instability of consumer prices.  
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Table 8: Macroeconomic, political and natural resource determinants of FDI inflows 
 
Dependent variable: FDI/GDP       
 OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
Explanatory 
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GDP growth 0.019** 
(0.009) 
0.041** 
(0.021) 
0.026** 
(0.010) 
0.030 
(0.022) 
0.017* 
(0.009) 
0.048*** 
(0.018) 
0.060*** 
(0.020) 
0.009 
(0.023) 
Openness  0.015*** 
(0.002) 
0.044*** 
(0.010) 
0.019*** 
(0.002) 
0.038*** 
(0.009) 
0.019*** 
(0.002) 
0.043*** 
(0.007) 
0.023*** 
(0.003) 
0.022*** 
(0.007) 
Log of telephone 
subscribers  
-0.312*** 
(0.052) 
0.564** 
(0.233) 
-0.228*** 
(0.055) 
0.122 
(0.194) 
-0.226*** 
(0.050) 
0.451*** 
(0.191) 
-0.027 
(0.082) 
0.023 
(0.180) 
Log of stock of 
FDI inflows (t-1) 
0.268*** 
(0.038) 
0.937*** 
(0.231) 
0.250*** 
(0.037) 
0.667*** 
(0.186) 
0.241*** 
(0.034) 
0.638*** 
(0.173) 
0.147** 
(0.068) 
0.740*** 
(0.185) 
Post-1997  0.974*** 
(0.146) 
0.548 
(0.407) 
1.139*** 
(0.136) 
0.939*** 
(0.403) 
0.908*** 
(0.128) 
0.833** 
(0.366) 
0.845*** 
(0.194) 
0.301 
(0.310) 
REER detrended 0.0002 
(0.001) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
      
REER volatility -0.0017 
(0.0015) 
0.012** 
(0.005) 
      
CPI detrended   -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0007) 
    
CPI volatility   0.004*** 
(0.000) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
    
Weakly 
autocraticb 
    0.114 
(0.137) 
0.402 
(0.339) 
  
Weakly 
democraticb 
    0.294* 
(0.179) 
-0.799** 
(0.392) 
  
Strongly 
democraticb 
    0.079 
(0.134) 
-1.069*** 
(0.361) 
  
Oil, mineral & ore 
exports (% of total 
exports) 
      0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.014* 
(0.007) 
R² 0.26 0.12 0.42 0.16 0.30 0.19 0.27 0.16 
F-Statistic 28.02*** 20.63*** 65.40*** 24.85*** 42.40*** 28.34*** 24.26*** 15.26*** 
No. of obs. 577 577 646 646 794 794 391 391 
 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses; *** - significant at the 1 per cent level, ** - 
significant at the 5 per cent level, and * - significant at the 10 per cent level; 
OLS = robust OLS regression where outliers are weighted; FE = fixed effects regression. The 
R-squared reported for the fixed-effects model is the overall statistic.  
 
3.3 Domestic factor markets as determinants of FDI 
Having established the role of structural determinants of FDI, we now turn to 
examining whether domestic factor markets have an additional effect on FDI. 
Unfortunately, the lack of adequate data on labour market characteristics makes it 
difficult to undertake panel data econometrics. Therefore, we focus on the impact of 
domestic and public investment on FDI. We add indicators of these factors to the base 
equation including structural determinants.  
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The estimates presented in Table 9 underscore the important relationship between FDI 
inflows and both private and public investment. Though the coefficient on public 
investment is larger in the OLS estimates (column 1), the fixed-effects estimator 
indicates a stronger impact of private investment on FDI inflows (column 2). This is 
evidence that higher levels of private investment can help attract FDI inflows, possibly 
due to a signalling effect as higher private investment is seen as an indication of high 
returns to capital. Higher levels of public investment, particularly in areas like 
infrastructure, is expected to reduce production and trade costs and hence provide a 
more profitable environment for foreign investors.  
 
Given the importance of the commodity boom as a driver of FDI inflows and 
economic growth in general in Africa, it is important to investigate how the above 
results vary by resource intensity. To carry out this exercise, we split the sample again 
according to the groupings defined by Collier and O’Connell (2006) (see Appendix I 
for an explanation of these groupings). 
 
Using this classification indicates that FDI inflows are driven by different factors in 
resource-rich countries in comparison to resource-poor economies. As displayed in 
Table 9, in non-resource-intensive countries, the coefficient estimate show that 
infrastructure is an important driver of FDI in non-resource sectors.  The stock of FDI 
and private investment are also significant determinants of FDI inflows in these 
countries. In contrast, infrastructure does not appear to matter in resource-intensive 
countries. At the same time, openness of the country is important, which is consistent 
with FDI inflows in these countries being driven by the opportunity to export natural 
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resources. The stock of FDI has a large correlation with FDI inflows, which captures 
both the attraction of new FDI to countries with existing investments and reinvested 
profits of transnational corporations returning as FDI inflows to the receiving country. 
Private investment is also significant in this sub-sample with an even larger coefficient 
than in the case of the non-resource-intensive group. 
 
Table 9: Domestic investment as determinants of FDI inflows 
 
Dependent variable: FDI/GDP Full sample Full sample Non-resource intense Resource intense 
 OLS FE FE FE 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP growth 0.025** 
(0.010) 
0.048** 
(0.019) 
0.021 
(0.015) 
0.056 
(0.054) 
Openness  0.018*** 
(0.002) 
0.029*** 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
0.058*** 
(0.019) 
Log of telephone subscribers  -0.192*** 
(0.052) 
0.477** 
(0.201) 
0.552*** 
(0.157) 
0.449 
(0.541) 
Log of stock of FDI inflows (t-1) 0.246*** 
(0.041) 
0.560*** 
(0.183) 
0.480*** 
(0.136) 
1.665*** 
(0.581) 
Post-1997  1.012*** 
(0.135) 
0.727** 
(0.368) 
0.324 
(0.286) 
1.118 
(1.000) 
Private investment/GDP 0.023** 
(0.009) 
0.159*** 
(0.026) 
0.044** 
(0.022) 
0.291*** 
(0.059) 
Public investment/GDP 0.031** 
(0.014) 
0.067** 
(0.034) 
0.028 
(0.026) 
0.117 
(0.059) 
R2 0.30 0.18 0.19 0.16 
F-Statistic 45.05*** 36.58*** 23.99*** 19.66*** 
No. of obs. 748 748 540 208 
 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses; *** - significant at the 1 per cent level, ** - 
significant at the 5 per cent level, and * - significant at the 10 per cent level;  
OLS = robust OLS regression where outliers are weighted; FE = fixed effects regression. The 
R-squared report for the fixed-effects model is the overall statistic.  
 
  
4. Impact of FDI on domestic investment 
 
Section 3 has provided an insight into how domestic investment affects foreign 
investment in a sample of 38 Sub-Saharan African countries. The relationship between 
FDI and domestic investment is likely to be bi-directional with FDI inflows also 
having an impact on factor markets. The most debated aspect of this relationship is 
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whether foreign investment crowds in or crowds out domestic activity. This has been 
investigated by a range of studies, including some on Africa, which generally find that 
the effect is mostly neutral (see Agosin and Machado, 2005; UNCTAD, 2003; 
UNECA, 2006; and other references therein). This section explores this relation in the 
case of African countries. The analysis in this section is based on the following 
specification: 
 iti
itit
it
it GDP
PUB
GDP
FDIW
GDP
PRIV υξλθζγ ++++′+= ,   (2) 
where PRIV/GDP is private investment as a ratio to real GDP, FDI/GDP is the net 
inflow of foreign direct investment as a ratio to real GDP, PUB/GDP is public 
investment as a ratio to real GDP, W is a vector of other determinants of private 
investment, while ξi is the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity term and υit is the 
random error term. 
 
Using this specification and controlling for country-specific effects, there is evidence 
of a positive impact of FDI on private investment, suggesting crowding-in of private 
investment by FDI (Table 10). Public investment doesn’t appear to affect private 
investment once country-specific effects are accounted for. A strong and volatile 
exchange rate reduces the private investment rate, which probably reflects the negative 
effects of an overvalued exchange rate on the investment decisions of export-oriented 
firms (columns 3 and 4). 
 
As found with in the case of FDI, the estimates for the determinants of private 
investment vary across countries by resource-intensity. Before looking at the 
differences, however, FDI appears to crowd in private investment in both resource-rich 
and resource-poor countries (columns 4 and 5, respectively). In comparison, public 
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investment crowds out private investment in resource-intensive countries, but crowds 
in private activity in non-resource intensive economies. Growth in GDP only has a 
positive impact on private investment in the case of resource rich countries. In contrast 
to the results for FDI (Table 9), openness is only significant in the non-resource-
intensive countries, which implies that private investment in these economies is 
nonetheless very much driven by trade. In both samples, there appears to be no 
correlation between private investment and the level of infrastructure as measured by 
the number of telephone subscribers. 
 
Table 10: The determinants of private investment 
 
Dependent variable: Private investment/GDP    
 Full 
sample 
Full 
sample 
Full 
sample 
Resource-
intense 
Non-
resource 
intense 
 OLS FE FE FE FE 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FDI/GDP -0.079 
(0.051) 
0.359*** 
(0.057) 
0.398*** 
(0.053) 
0.311*** 
(0.095) 
0.387*** 
(0.085) 
Public investment/GDP -0.184*** 
(0.040) 
-0.050 
(0.050) 
0.043 
(0.053) 
-0.106** 
(0.053) 
0.214* 
(0.126) 
GDP growth 0.098*** 
(0.031) 
0.046 
(0.029) 
0.026 
(0.028) 
-0.002 
(0.032) 
0.199*** 
(0.063) 
Openness  0.049*** 
(0.006) 
0.060*** 
(0.012) 
0.045*** 
(0.014) 
0.065*** 
(0.013) 
0.034 
(0.023) 
Log of telephone subscribers  1.017*** 
(0.128) 
0.032 
(0.187) 
-0.325 
(0.234) 
0.271 
(0.213) 
-0.540 
(0.398) 
REER detrended   -0.011** 
(0.005) 
  
REER volatility   -0.036*** 
(0.007) 
  
R2 0.28 0.21 0.14 0.29 0.03 
F-Statistic 60.77*** 21.58*** 26.65*** 11.66*** 12.41*** 
No. of obs. 806 806 536 582 224 
 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses; *** - significant at the 1 per cent level, ** - 
significant at the 5 per cent level, and * - significant at the 10 per cent level 
OLS = robust OLS regression where outliers are weighted; FE = fixed effects regression. The 
R-squared reported for the fixed-effects model is the overall statistic.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
The objective of this study was to contribute to the literature on the causes and effects 
of FDI in African economies by focusing on the linkages between FDI and domestic 
factor markets. In particular, the study investigated whether domestic investment 
promotes FDI inflows and is in turn affected by FDI. While the literature has provided 
much evidence on the determinants of FDI (although much less is still known in the 
case of African countries) and the effects of FDI on growth, very little is know about 
how FDI itself affects domestic factor markets. Understanding the linkages between 
FDI and factor markets is key to uncovering the channels through which FDI affect 
economic performance, which helps to identify the policy levers that may be activated 
to maximize both FDI inflows and the gains from FDI for the host economy. This 
paper attempted to fill this gap. 
 
The empirical results in this study show that the relationship between FDI and 
domestic investment runs both ways, especially in the case of private investment. FDI 
crowds in private investment in this sample of SSA countries. However, the results 
also clearly indicate that the impact of private investment on FDI is stronger and more 
robust than the reverse relation. This result has important policy implications. In 
particular, the evidence suggests that African countries will benefit from measures 
aimed at promoting domestic private investment given that a strong investment 
performance will serve as a sign of high returns to capital, which in turn will attract 
more foreign capital. In contrast, any temptation to offer disproportionate advantages 
to foreign investors would be ill advised given that, from the evidence in this study, 
FDI does not appear to strongly boost domestic private investment. National policies 
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should aim at harnessing complementarities between domestic private investment and 
FDI rather than regarding them as substitutes. 
 
The analysis in this study also documents the importance of resource endowment as a 
driver of FDI. The results suggest that FDI is driven by different factors in resource-
intensive relative to non-resource-intensive countries. In particular, infrastructure is 
critical for attracting FDI in non-resource rich countries but not in those with 
resources. This suggests that non-resource rich countries have to work harder to entice 
foreign investors. At the same time, this also implies that there are alternatives to 
resource endowments as a means of attracting foreign investment. Thus, by designing 
the right policy frameworks, African countries can make progress in overcoming 
marginalisation in the global economy. 
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Appendix I – Data 
 
Sample:  
 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
 
Sub-samples based on resource-intensity: 
 
These groupings follows Collier and O’Connell (2006) who classifies a country as 
resource-rich if primary commodity rents exceed 10 per cent of GDP. 
 
1. Resource-intensive: 
• Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Gabon, Nigeria (oil) 
• Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Namibia, Zambia (non-oil) 
 
2. Non-resource-intensive: 
• Benin, Burkina Faso Burundi, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, 
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
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Variables: 
 
 
Variable name Description Source 
FDI/GDP Inflows of foreign direct investment as a ratio 
of real GDP 
UNCTAD (2007) 
GDP growth Real GDP growth (annual %)  World Bank (2007) 
Openness Exports plus imports/GDP World Bank (2007) 
Log of telephone 
subscribers 
Telephone subscribers = fixed line plus mobile 
subscribers 
World Bank (2007) 
Log of FDI stock Log of inward stock of FDI, US$ million UNCTAD (2007) 
Detrended REER Real effective exchange rate (2000=100), 
detrended with linear time trend 
World Bank (2007) 
REER volatility REER volatility=absolute value of REER – 
detrended REER 
World Bank (2007) 
Detrended CPI Inflation, consumer prices (annual %), 
detrended with linear time trend 
World Bank (2007) 
CPI volatility CPI volatility= absolute value of CPI– 
detrended CPI 
World Bank (2007) 
Polity score Combined polity score, ranges from -10 
(strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly 
democratic) 
Polity IV Project 
Oil, mineral and ore 
exports as % of total 
merchandise exports 
Oil, mineral and ore exports as % of total 
merchandise exports 
World Bank (2007) 
Ogive concentration index Ogive concentration index UNECA (2007) 
Private investment/GDP Private investment as a ratio of real GDP World Bank (2006) 
Public investment/GDP Public investment as a ratio of real GDP World Bank (2006) 
Youth literacy rate Youth population are defined as 15-24 UNESCO (2007) 
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Appendix II – Tables 
 
Table A1: Summary Statistics – FDI, private and public investment 
 
Country FDI/GDP PRIV/GDP PUB/GDP
Angola 6.93 12.25 6.07 
Benin 1.18 8.60 7.52 
Botswana 2.32 21.18 12.65 
Burkina Faso 0.27 11.65 8.58 
Burundi 0.19 1.86 10.71 
Cameroon 0.40 16.89 4.13 
Central African 0.39 4.90 5.73 
Chad 6.16 8.08 6.85 
Congo, Rep. 3.45 15.88 7.92 
Cote d'Ivoire 1.30 9.69 6.58 
Ethiopia 1.29 12.51 5.64 
Gabon 0.57 23.21 9.61 
The Gambia 2.79 10.81 8.82 
Ghana 1.38 8.48 9.26 
Guinea 0.99 10.43 6.60 
Guinea-Bissau 1.09 6.78 20.51 
Kenya 0.37 9.70 6.27 
Lesotho 2.35 33.86 15.60 
Madagascar 0.50 6.06 7.13 
Malawi 0.93 6.02 10.59 
Mali 1.25 12.72 9.43 
Mauritania 1.68 13.07 7.76 
Mauritius 0.80 18.63 5.62 
Mozambique 2.32 12.59 10.83 
Namibia 3.40 11.45 9.03 
Niger 0.84 3.64 8.31 
Nigeria 2.46 9.84 9.30 
Rwanda 0.50 8.21 9.65 
Senegal 0.85 8.88 5.03 
Seychelles 5.21 15.52 10.59 
South Africa 0.55 10.03 7.07 
Sudan 1.58 11.42 3.87 
Swaziland 3.78 15.90 7.59 
Tanzania 2.23 12.46 5.83 
Togo 1.66 11.23 6.60 
Uganda 1.65 10.07 5.28 
Zambia 2.80 6.68 8.14 
Zimbabwe 0.59 14.13 2.54 
 
Notes: FDI/GDP = foreign direct investment/GDP; PRIV/GDP = gross private 
investment/GDP; PUB/GDP = gross public investment/GDP.  
Source: UNCTAD, FDI online database; World Bank Africa Database 2006; World 
Development Indicators, online database. 
